The linguistic studies written by Anna Wierzbicka have been an occasion for the remarks on the relationship between linguistics and philosophy and for the question whether linguistic enquiries entitle us to put forward philosophical theses. In particular, whether and to what extent we indeed learn something philosophically significant about the world (of culture) and the nature man and his mind by examining language. Defining here position as interdisciplinary, Wierzbicka draws on the studies of the relationship between language and culture, language (...) and mind (language is a mirror of the mind - Leibniz). She claims that philosophy can be made a reliable science, provided it is based on linguistics, and the results of linguistic analyses can be found at the grounds of philosophical theses. Such philosophical references are A. Wierzbicka\'s attempts to combine semantics with generativism (Chomsky). Her intention to bring about a holistic description of language through defining elementary expressions (concepts, meanings), the so-called indefinibilia (\"primitives\") can also be called philosophical in character. They suffice to define all the remaining expressions, and basic universal syntactic constructs in the form of a grammar of elementary units, i.e. the ways of combining elementary units into greater wholes. We think that Wierzbicka\'s procedure, her quest after primary elements (of language) are reducing. A. Wierzbicka\'s main idea, with regard to the relationship between language and mind, may be understood as follows: this is a Janus-faced relationship - one face (empirically accessible) is language, the other one is the mind accessible through investigations on language. Both \"faces\" (spheres) are somehow functionally \"glued together\". In fact, however, Wierzbicka speaks little about the philosophically comprehended nature of man, whereas she speaks much about linguistic varieties and similarities among people. Generally speaking, while she declares herself to be a linguist, she has a philosophical temper and ambitions to generalise, i.e. she conducts linguistic studies with an intention to arrive at philosophical theses (by examining language she wants to obtain knowledge about the world and man). She issues statements which go beyond a purely linguistic knowledge and strictly linguistic data, hence they are not made legitimate by the linguistic material itself. A. Wierzbicka does not explain in more detail her way of understanding philosophy, assuming its intuitive comprehension. From some contexts it can be deduced that she takes it to mean a worldview. Should we call some parts of her reasoning a philosophy, it is then not a realistic philosophy but subject-oriented (first-person philosophising), such that touches upon the problems of the borderline between linguistics and philosophy, more concerned with the axis language-user than language-the world. Simultaneously, it is a non-demarcated and non-autonomic philosophising, exactly within the context of science, for it takes advantage of the results of empirical sciences to pose philosophical theses. The belief that philosophy can be pursued within a linguistic context coincides with the approach of analytical philosophy with its linguistic turn. Despite her declarations to make philosophy more scientific, Wierzbicka\'s arguments on behalf of the generalised (philosophical) theses are more their illustration and explication than a decisive legitimacy. Her belief that one can find some common, primitive linguistic units (simplicia) in the form of a complete set of independent concepts for all languages of the world seems Utopian. It is difficult to do it even in deductive systems, constructed by way of the axiomatic method and with a finite set of initial expressions. (shrink)

It is rather uncontroversial that gender should have no influence on treating others as equal epistemic agents. However, is this view reflected in practice? This paper aims to test whether the gender of the testifier and the accused of assault is related to the perception of a testimony’s reliability and the guilt of the potential perpetrator. Two experiments were conducted: the subjects (n = 361, 47% females, 53% males) assessed the reliability of the testifier in four scenarios of assault accusation, (...) in which the only difference was the gender of the people presented. During the study, we have observed dependencies of gender and ascription of reliability, but only marginal differences in guilt attribution. The results of our research may constitute an argument for the existence of different epistemic status endowed on people depending on their gender and existing gender stereotypes. Our results suggest that gender bias may be situated at a deeper level than the linguistically triggered representation. (shrink)

As the concept of recognition shifts from philosophical theory to other fields of the humanities and social sciences, this volume explores the nature of this border category that exists in the space between sociological and philosophical considerations, related as it is to concepts such as status, prestige, the looking-glass self, respect, and dignity - at times being used interchangeably with these terms. Bringing together work from across academic disciplines, it presents theoretical conceptualizations of recognition, demonstrates its operationalization in historical and (...) literary research, considers recognition as a fundamental problem of sociological theory and examines the concept as a marker of social distances and redistribution. An examination and demonstration of the full potential of recognition as a category, Understanding Recognition: Conceptual and Empirical Studies explores the contemporary meanings and manifestations of recognition and sheds light on its capacity to complement the notions of status, class or prestige. As such, it will appeal to scholars of sociology and social theory, philosophy, history and literary studies. (shrink)

This book introduces the English-speaking reader to the thought of Stanislaw Brzozowski (1878-1911), the outstanding Polish philosopher and literary critic. Although practically unknown in the West, Brzozowski is an important but neglected forerunner of the intellectual tradition of `Western Marxism', most commonly associated with Georg Lukács and Antonio Gramsci. -/- Concentrating first on the early phase of Brzozowski's thought, Professor Walicki goes on to analyse his ideas on the working class and its relation to the intelligentsia and contemporary working-class ideologies. (...) Finally he deals with aspects of his thought which go beyond the Marxian problematic and round off the intellectual portrait of the man. -/- Brzozowski's anti-naturalistic approach resulted in a radical reinterpretation of Marxism which dealt with many of the problems of the revolt against positivism in European philosophy. Professor Walicki argues that the retrieval of the philosophical and humanist aspect of Marxism, and its separation from the Engels-inspired `scientific Marxism', was the achievement of Brzozowski and not, as frequently assumed, of Lukács, who came to similar conclusions only some ten years later. -/- By placing Brzozowski within the cross-currents of the various philosophical, sociological, literary, and political streams of Western and Eastern European thought in which Marxism was situated, Professor Walicki produces a fascinating study of an early East European challenge to orthodox Marxism. (shrink)

In this brief note we would like to outline the main events of life and the main achievements of Stanisław Jaśkowski one of the important Polish logician and mathematician of the first half of twentieth century.

In 1934 Stanisław Jaśkowski published his groundbreaking work on natural deduction. At the same year Gerhard Gentzen also published a work on the same topic. We aim at presenting of Jaśkowski’s system and provide a comparison with Gentzen’s approach. We also try to outline the influence of Jaśkowski’s approach on the later development of natural deduction systems.

The paper presents fragments of a Byzantine icon discovered in 2015 during regular archaeological excavations carried out in Chełm, eastern Poland. Iconographic analyses allow the nine surviving fragments to be interpreted as belonging to a diptych wing with the Great Feasts cycle. The icon represents archaic iconography of the subject, with the scene of Transfiguration placed after Entry into Jerusalem and before the Crucifixion. The artefact was created in the second half or at the close of the 12th century, and (...) it was made from steatite, which has been confirmed by petrographic analyses. The icon was discovered in the remains of a palace complex of King Daniel Romanovich, the greatest ruler of the Galicia-Volhynia Lands. The results of the archaeological research allow the terminus ante quem for the icon’s arrival in Chełm to be determined as before the middle of the 13th century. Various possible explanations as to how the icon found its way to Chełm are also explored in the paper. (shrink)

Profesor Andrzej Walicki, born in 1930, is a historian of philosophy and social thought connected with the so called „Warsaw School of the History of Ideas" prevalent during the 1960s. His field of specialization is the history of Russian and Polish thought and also that of Marxist philosophy. Until 1981, he was professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology PAN. During the time of martial law, Walicki was in Australia as a visiting professor of the Australian National University (...) of Canberra. In 1986, he started working at the University of Notre Dame in the USA as chief of the chair of the history of ideas, where he continued to work until 1999, the vear of his retirement. (shrink)

Since the late 1980s, there has been a considerable growth in the numer of Polish contributions to the Latin American archaeoastronomy. Much of this interest in archaeoastronomy is an outcome of the scientific activities of Professor Andrzej Wiercinski who in the 1970s was fascinated with the claims for sophisticated Megalithic astronomy advocated by early British archaeoastronomers. The paper provides a brief description of the greatest Polish achievements in the field of Latin American archaeoastronomy.

The article reviews the book Universal Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Vol. 6, edited by Andrzej Maryniarczyk.

Stanisław Kamiński (1919-1986) was a philosopher, philosopher of science and historian of science. He defended in 1949 at the Catholic University in Lublin (KUL) his PhD thesis on Frege's axiomatic system of the sentence logic in the light of the contemporary methodology of deductive science. Since 1957 he was the head of the Chair of Methodology (the first one in Poland, founded in 1952 by J. Iwanicki) at the KUL, since 1965 the associate and since 1970 the full professor (...) of KUL. He was for many years the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy KUL where he developed the methodological foundations of the »Lublin-school of philosophy«. The main interests of S. Kamiński (1919-1986) was history of science and logic, general and special methodology, methodology of philosophy and (medieval) semiotics. Himself he saw his main achievements in the domain of the theory of science and the methodology of classical philosophy, especially in the studies of the method and language of metaphysics; he gave a methodological description of general metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and studies on religion (religiology); he investigated the beginnings of the mathematical induction in the Middle Ages and in modern times, modern history of the theory of definition (Th. Hobbes, B. Pascal, J. Locke, E. B. de Condillac, J. D. Gergonne), the theory of argumentation (reasoning), the structure and the evolution of scientific theory, the deductive method (B. Pascal, G. W. Leibniz, G. Frege), the achievements of logic and philosophy in Poland. A characteristic feature of S. Kamiński's philosophical and methodological approach was a specific historicism, consisting of referring to the heritage of the past and at the same time to the latest achievements in logic and philosophy of science. He looked to history for inspiration, for how to solve his own problems and for a partial confirmation of legitimacy of his answers. He also used history to better understand the context of the discussed problems. His methodological interests are characterized by a philosophical and historical approach. He had a broad concept of knowledge and was maximalist both in raising questions and in giving answers. He cultivated the ideal of rational knowledge. In accordance with classical philosophy he saw the substance of person as ens rationale, a being realizing himself in a disinterested search for a theoretical truth, whose highest expression is philosophy. He stressed the epistemological and methodological plurality of knowledge and distinguished (with Kant) a material and formal part of knowledge, assuming that the formal element manifests itself as the logical form in the formal procedures of the (scientific) cognitive processes, that is in the (scientific) method and the (scientific) language. Making many attempts at a methodological characterization of different types of cognition and knowledge he distinguished – besides commonsense knowledge that lies at the bottom of any other type of knowledge – the scientific, philosophical and theological knowledge. None of them can be reduced to other type of knowledge, because each of them has its own problems, goals and methods. At the top there is a kind of sapiential knowledge which is much more than a simple generalization of all particular kinds of knowledge. S. Kamiński indebted his understanding of science to contemporary philosophy and to the classical philosophy. The nature of science was determined by him from the point view of its subject matter, aims, methods, logical structure and genesis. The question of what science is concerned with, i.e. what is its subject matter, is a philosophical question, it presupposes an appropriate understanding of the nature of the world. S. Kamiński opted for a pluralistic approach to the world: the principal object of science is the objective world but so are subjective states of man and products of his mind and his language. The best diagnostic test of the scientific character of science is the scientific method. Also here – rejecting the scientism (i.e. the view, that the scientific method and knowledge is the pattern and the measure of each knowledge) – S. Kamiński takes a pluralistic attitude. Accepting that the scientific method is not simple, that there is not one uncomplicated ideal way of doing science, and that because of the multiplicity of questions and scientific aims it would be difficult to construct one universal scientific method as a uniform set of rules for every kind of science, S. Kamiński assumes that different subject matter and different goals of scientific cognition require different research strategies and types of cognitive procedures. One manifestation of S. Kamiński's methodological pluralism is his antinaturalistic position in the theory of the humanities where he supported the thesis of their methodological autonomy with regard to natural sciences. Closer to the philosophical cognition and knowledge, the humanities do not meet and can not meet the conditions imposed upon the natural sciences, as they differ from them in subject matter (the world of culture) and hence in method (understanding, interpretation) used. The publications of S. Kamiński include over 350 positions. During his life he published three books: Georgonne'a teoria definicji [Georgonne's Theory of Definition], Lublin 1958; Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], Lublin 1961, 19813; and [together with M. A. Krąpiec] Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics], Lublin 1962. After his death five volumes of Collected Papers have been published: vol. I: Jak filozofować? [How to Philosophize? Studies in Methodology of Classical Philosophy], edited by Tadeusz Szubka, Lublin 1989; vol. II: Filozofia i metoda. Studia z dziejów metod filozofowania [Philosophy and Method. Studies from the History of the Method of Philosophizing], edited by Józef Herbut, Lublin 1993; vol. III: Metoda i język. Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk [Method and Language. Studies in Semiotics and Philosophy of Science], edited by Urszula Żegleń, Lublin 1994; vol. IV: Nauka i metoda. Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Science and Method. Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], edited by Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1992); vol. V: Światopogląd - Religia - Teologia [Worldview - Religion - Theology], edited by Monika Walczak and Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1998. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show the role, the possibilities and the limits of Wyspiański’s national thinking through Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Of particular importance, in this context, is the role the Ghost takes in Wyspiański’s celebrated interpretation of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. By the Ghost we mean the spirit of history, the ghost of a father, the spirit of the fatherland, the voice of the ancestors, and particularly that of the Polish king Casimir the Great, as well as the Holy Ghost (...) and the Evil Spirit because all these aspects of the Ghost belong to Wyspiański’s vision. The play in question bears witness to what the Polish poet calls “the truth of other worlds,” as well as the truth of the theatre, which Wyspiański calls the labyrinth. The poet manages to reduce, to some extent, this difficult truth to the truth of the world he cared most about, that is the present and historical reality of Poland, more specifically the city of Cracow, known as Poland’s spiritual, that is “ghostly,” and only virtual, capital. It is also remarkable that Wyspiański saw the Ghost in Hamlet in the context of other Shakespearean ghosts, apparitions and magicians, such as those that appear in Macbeth, The Tempest, Julius Caesar, A Midsummer Night’s Dream or Richard III. At the same time, Wyspiański realizes that the Ghost, with its irrationalism, offends the spirit of post-medieval times, and as such, is understandably neglected by Hamlet, who for Wyspiański, in anticipation of Harold Bloom, stands for modernity. (shrink)

In this paper, we want to present the genesis of Stanisław Leśniewski’s mereology. Although ‘mereology’ comes from theword ‘part’, mereology arose as a theory of collective classes. That is why we present the differences between the concepts of being a distributive class and being a collective class. Next, we present Leśniewski’s original mereology from 1927, but with a modern approach. Leśniewski was inspired to create his concept of classes and their elements by Russell’s antinomy. To face it, Leśniewski had (...) to define the concept of being an element of based on the concept of being part of. Leśniewski showed that in his theory, there is no equivalent to Russell’s antinomy. We will show that his solution has nothing to do with the original approach because, in both cases, we are talking about objects of a different kind. Russell’s original antinomy concerned distributive classes, and Leśsniewski’s considerations concerned collective classes. (shrink)

We classify two of Bertrand Russell's theories of events within the point-free ontology. The first of such approaches was presented informally by Russell in ‘The World of Physics and the World of Sense’ (Lecture IV in Our Knowledge of the External World of 1914). Based on this theory, Russell sketched ways to construct instants as collections of events. This paper formalizes Russell's approach from 1914. We will also show that in such a reconstructed theory, we obtain all axioms of Russell's (...) second theory from 1936 and all axioms of Thomason's theory of events from 1989. Russell's work certainly influenced the works of Stanisław Leśniewski, his student Alfred Tarski, and Czesław Lejewski – prominent members of the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS). We see our work in the tradition of the research of Leśniewski and Tarski. Building on the technical tools developed in this environment and in the spirit of the traditional research of the LWS, we engage here, in particular, with two classic works by Russell on fundamental ontology. (shrink)

Mereology is as a theory of collective sets (or mereological sums). It was formulated by the Polish logician Stanisław Leśniewski. Collective sets are wholes composed of parts, and the concept of being a collective set itself can be defined with the help of the concept of being a part. Mereology may therefore be considered as a theory of „the relation of a part to the whole” (from the Greek: μέρος – „part”). Leśniewski’s mereology was an untypical conception, for it (...) differed from the standard formulations. However, it can be reformulated in the language of structure theory. In the paper, firstly, I examine existentially neutral theories, in which one may prove the existence of only those mereological sums that it is possible to obtain exclusively via the definition of and fundamental properties of the concept of being a part. Moreover, I examine some existentially involved theories of parts (Grzegorczykian mereology and Leśniewskian mereology). One of the main principles of mereology is the transitivity of the concept being a part. This property is often called into question in the literature. Finally, I present an analysis without the assumed transitivity. (shrink)

The article discusses the sources of philosophical inspirations of Andrzej Maryniarczyk, one of the most outstanding representatives of the third generation of the Lublin Philosophical School. This school draws on the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, in which metaphysics plays a central role. Thus, it is not surprising that it was the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas that became Maryniarczyk’s main research subject and a source of inspiration. The author of Metoda metafizyki realistycznej [The Method of Realistic Metaphysics] was also interested in (...) the thought of Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec and Karol Wojtyła, contemporary representatives of the Thomistic tradition, and, at the same time, prominent representatives of the Lublin Philosophical School. From his predecessors, Maryniarczyk learned what philosophy is, what its subject is, and how it should be practiced. He treated these thinkers as his guides in realistic philosophizing, drawing from them inspiration for being a philosopher in the twenty-first century by taking a particular attitude towards reality and ongoing discourse. (shrink)

The conflict between religion and science is considered from the point of view of a tension between two types of knowledge: religious and scientific. These are indicative of a fundamental conflict between two attitudes towards the world: looking at the world either from the point view of revelation or natural knowledge. I argue that religion and science can be seen as complementary, not threatening the views of each other. Science itself is neither theistic nor atheistic. It becomes such due to (...) ideological interpretation. Scientific propositions and theories neither directly support nor threaten religion; the problem of existence of God and the supernatural is beyond the capabilities of science. The argument for the neutrality of science can be grounded in the fact that both theism and atheism derive support from science. (shrink)

Les règlements de compte en Pologne après la chute du communisme ont pris un tour particulier. Entre les désirs d'une réconciliation nationale et d'une justice publique, les Polonais ont oscillé. A partir de 1997, s'est finalement mis en place un processus dit de « lustration » qui consiste à demander aux diffé­rents titulaires de responsabilité publique de déclarer leurs activités sous le communisme. Un débat s'est instauré à ce propos, dans lequel les médias, s'appuyant sur les sondages ont joué un (...) rôle important. Autre signe du désir de la Pologne de changer de mémoire, la modification des noms des villes et des rues : où l'on voit que l'on n'efface pas facilement le passé.The settling of accounts in Poland after the fall of Communism took a specific turn as the Polish popu­lation hesitated between its desire for national reconciliation and for public justice. Eventually, from 1997, the process known as "lustration" was introduced, whereby the various holders of public office were required to state their activities under Communism. This gave rise to a debate in which the media, drawing on opinion polls, played an important part. Another sign of Poland' s desire to alter its memory was the changing of street and city names, which shows that it is not so easy to erase the past. (shrink)